Auctions under Asymmetric Information on Nature's selection
Dr. Takayuki Ito
Visiting ResearcherÊ
Division of Engineering and Applied Science
Harvard University
Thursday, Sept 29, 2005
1:30 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.
Building M-50, Auditorium
1200 Montreal Road
Ottawa, ONÊ

Abstract

Auction mechanisms have been studied very widely in the field of multiagent systems. In everyday life, it is often difficult for us to correctly know the quality of goods that are traded. In particular, on the Internet auctions, there exist many, and unspecified, persons who are selling their goods. If we misjudge the quality of a good, and purchase a poor quality item at an expensive price, we suffer loss by the trade. In game theory, information, such as quality, that cannot be determined by sellers and buyers is called Nature's selection. Experts who can recognize the nature's selection take advantage of it in trading. If we can make experts reveal their information on nature's selection, our auction mechanism can support people to make socially desirable decisions.Ê

In this research, we have proposed auction mechanisms under asymmetric information on nature's selection. In this talk, we present a single unit auction protocol among experts and amateurs and a combinatorial auction protocol among single-skilled experts and amateurs. We also focus on versatile experts, who have interest in, and expert knowledge of, the qualities of several items. In the case of versatile experts, there are several problems, e.g., free riding problems, if we simply extend the previous VCG-style auction protocol. Thus, we employ a PORF (price-oriented, rationing-free) protocol for designing our new protocol to realize a strategy-proof auction protocol for experts. In the protocol, the dominant strategy for experts is telling the truth. Also for amateurs, telling the truth is the best response when two or more experts select the dominant strategy. Furthermore, the protocol is false-name-proof.

Biography

Dr. Takayuki Ito is an Associate Professor of Graduate School of Engineering at Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan and a visiting researcher at Division of Engineering and Applied Science, Harvard University and a visiting researcher at Sloan School of Management, MIT. His main research interests include multi-agent systems, auction theory, group decision support systems, and agent-mediated electronic commerce. He received the B.E., M.E, and Doctor of Engineering from the Nagoya Institute of Technology in 1995, 1997, and 2000, respectively. From 1999 to 2001, he was a research fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). From 2000 to 2001, he was a visiting researcher at USC/ISI (University of Southern California/ Information Sciences Institute). From April 2001 to March 2003, he was Associate Professor of Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST). He is a Founder, a Senior Vice President, Chief Operating Officer of Wisdom Web Co., Ltd!
Ê. from July 13, 2004.