@inproceedings{Jaskolka2011ac,
	Abstract = {With the emergence of computers in every day activities and with the ever-growing complexity of networks and network communication protocols, covert channels are becoming an eminent threat to the confidentiality of information. We propose a technique to detect confidential information leakage via covert channels. The proposed technique is based on relational algebra. It provides tests to verify the existence of a leakage of information via a monitored covert channel. The technique also provides computations which show how the information was leaked if a leakage exists.

Our focus is limited to protocol-based covert channels and instances where the users of covert channels modulate the information that is being sent; either by encryption, or some other form of encoding. We discuss possible applications of the proposed technique in digital forensics and cryptanalysis. We also report on a prototype tool that allows for the automation of the proposed technique.},
	Address = {Oak Ridge, TN, USA},
	Author = {Jason Jaskolka and Ridha Khedri and Khair Eddin Sabri},
	Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop},
	Month = {October},
	Pages = {1-4},
	Series = {CSIIRW7},
	Title = {A Formal Test for Detecting Information Leakage via Covert Channels},
	Year = {2011}
}